Macours, Karen-Ethnic divisions, contract choice, and search costs in the Guatemalan land rental market This paper shows how ethnic diversity in a context of weak property rights enforcement can result in market segmentation. The paper analyzes how contract enforcement problems affect the joint decision of partner and contract choice by landlords in the land rental market in Guatemala. The empirical method allows partner choice to be determined not only by the characteristics and relative scarcity of the specific landowner and tenant, but also by the characteristics of other potential tenants. The results show that landowners without formal title are more likely to restrict their partners to tenants from the same ethnic group. Partner choice is found to be less important for renting with interlinked landlabor contracts.
Introduction
Ethnic diversity and polarization are often believed to negatively affect growth. This is not only motivated by many examples of violent and destabilizing ethnic conflicts in different parts of the world, but also by cross-country growth evidence showing a relationship between ethno-linguistic diversity, poor public policy performance, and economic growth (Easterly and Levine, 1997) . While evidence exists of both positive and negative effects of ethnic diversity on economic policies and outcomes, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) hypothesize that the benefits might be more relevant for richer societies, while the costs dominate in poorer countries.
An important explanation of why ethnic diversity could affect growth negatively in developing countries is that many informal enforcement mechanisms only work within the ethnic group. Collective action regarding group credit repayment (Karlan, 2007) or regarding funding of public goods (Miguel and Gugerty, 2005 ) might be more difficult in ethnically diverse groups because of the lack of social sanctions as enforcement mechanism. Greif (1993) documents how contract enforcement within a specific ethnic group of traders, based on information sharing and reputation effects, can explain their business success. Platteau (2000) points out that contract enforcement through this type of multilateral reputation mechanism is facilitated by the common cultural and linguistic background of members from the same ethnicity. It allows them to better reveal and signal their intended plan of actions and to learn about other's intentions. While there exists a fair amount of evidence on the importance of contracts within ethnic groups for access to credit and trade (Fafchamps, 2000; Biggs et al., 2002; Fisman, 2003) evidence on the effects of ethnic diversity on enforcement of agrarian contracts is scant. This paper analyzes the relationship between ethnic diversity and agrarian rental contracts in Guatemala. It analyzes the joint partner and contract choice in the land rental market in a context of property rights insecurity, and shows that property rights enforcement can explain market segmentation along ethnic lines. As such, it relates to Boucher et al. (2005) , Gine (2005) , and Vranken et al. (2011) who analyze the relationship between land rental market activity and property rights; Macours et al. (2010) 's analysis of participation and partner choice in tenancy markets; and Conning and Robinson (2007) who offer a model of tenancy reforms that accounts for landlord's anticipation that tenants might become squatters. This paper contributes to this literature by focussing on the link between property rights and the joint decision of partner and contract choice in the tenancy market.
The empirical analysis shows that plots without formal property rights are much more likely to be rented out to members from the same ethnic group. We test whether the observed patterns are also consistent with discrimination of indigenous tenants by all landowners, and find no evidence supporting this alternative hypothesis. Ethnic diversity in the absence of strong institutions and formal contract enforcement, might then have negative effects on growth not only because informal enforcement within ethnic circles of confidence might lead to a second-best allocation, but also because the resulting exclusion might lead to more ethnic tensions, inducing further insecurity of property rights and possibly violent conflicts. 1 Alternative mechanisms to enforce property rights with members of a different group might be necessary to help breaking this vicious circle.
This paper sheds light on such a mechanism by analyzing the choice between two different types of contracts. Landowners chose between fixed rent and interlinked land-labor contracts. The results show that matching along ethnic lines is less important for interlinked land-labor contracts, suggesting that the implicit enforcement mechanism the interlinked contracts entail, might decrease the (perceived) need for assortative matching. To the extent that interlinked contracts can be considered suboptimal in a first-best world, this finding indicates that property rights insecurity in the presence of ethnic diversity may affect efficiency not just through sub-optimal partner choice, but also through suboptimal contract choice. In this perspective, this paper is related to La Ferrara (2002) who shows that ethnic heterogeneity not only affects access to credit, but also influences the organization of production. It also relates closely to Lanjouw and Levy (2002) , who show that lack of formal or informal property rights limits the range of people one can transact with in the urban land market, and therefore impedes the allocation of properties to households who would value them the most.
The empirical strategy in this paper relies on estimating the landlord's choice of partner and contract-type jointly. Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) pointed out that many results in the empirical contract choice literature might be biased because they include both landlord and tenant characteristics, without accounting for endogenous matching between landlords and tenants. They suggest using an instrumental variable approach, with a matching equation in the first stage. They implement this for their analysis of the relationship between tenant's risk aversion and contract choice. Pandey (2004) and Bellemare (2006) follow a similar approach in their studies of contract choice. In these papers, the matching equation estimating the relationship between landlord and tenant characteristics does not depend on the characteristics of the other potential tenants in the market. This paper proposes an alternative methodology that allows for matching to be determined not only by the characteristics of the specific landowner and tenant of the match, but also by the characteristics of the other potential tenant-types using a nested logit framework.
To illustrate the methodological contribution, the paper compares the findings of the nested logit approach with those obtained using Ackerberg and Botticini's instrumental variable approach on the same data. In contrast with the IV approach, the nested logit allows to account for several tenant characteristics, and for the relative scarcity of each tenant-type. Accounting for the characteristics of other potential tenant-types might be important because not only the number of potential tenants of a certain type, but also the scarcity of the next-best type determine the potential trade-off the landlord faces when choosing a tenant. Differences in search costs among tenants are likely to matter as land rental activities in Guatemala often surpass community borders. For landlords this implies that the pool of potential tenants to consider is often large, but that search costs might be involved in finding a suitable partner. Matching is hence likely to be influenced by differences in search costs between different types of tenants. The nested logit results show that the relative scarcity of different tenant-types indeed is strongly related to partner choice. The empirical comparison of the two approaches demonstrates in turn that the nested logit allows to derive stronger conclusions regarding contract choice than the IV, possibly because the characteristics of other potential tenant-types are better accounted for in the partner choice. In addition, the nested logit also allows deriving conclusions on the importance of partner choice for different types of contracts.
While the methodology discussed above is general, we use it in this paper to investigate the relationship between ethnic diversity and contract enforcement. Anecdotal evidence, as well as indicators based on expert opinions, suggests that lack of contract enforcement, including property rights enforcement, is a very serious concern in Latin America. Indicators of procedural complexity for contract enforcements (including eviction of a residential tenant), developed by Djankov et al. (2003) and now widely used to compare countries, show that many Latin American countries, and Guatemala in particular, score extremely badly. This paper therefore not only broadens the existing evidence on ethnic diversity and contract enforcement, from credit or trade contracts in Africa towards agrarian contracts in a Latin American context, but also sheds light on an important and sensitive policy issue.
The next section provides more information about the specific context, while Section 3 describes the data collected for this study, and the different types of contracts that occur. Section 4 outlines the theoretical framework for the model, discusses the empirical strategy, and addresses identification issues. Section 5 presents the main results and robustness tests. It also compares the nested logit estimations with the instrumental variable approach. Section 6 concludes.
Context
Ethnicity in Guatemala is mainly defined along cultural and linguistic lines. There are 21 major indigenous groups as well as ladinos. The different indigenous groups are distinct from each other because of differences in language, culture, and customary rules (Barry, 1992) . Ladinos are of mixed Spanish and Indian descent and speak Spanish. They emerged as a separate group during the post-colonial period, and gained economic prominence with the establishment of the coffee plantation culture. Indigenous communities in the Western Highlands and Alta Verapaz maintained relative autonomy until the beginning of the 20th century, sustaining cultural differences (Smith, 1994) . Fights over land between communities were not uncommon during those periods of relative autonomy (McCreery, 1994) . Conflict resolution was often complicated because customary rules related to land ownership or user-rights disputes differed between groups, and some of the historical land conflicts between indigenous groups remain unresolved.
Within each ethnic group, there is large heterogeneity in class and there are both (relatively) poor ladino campesinos, and ''bourgeois '' Indians (Smith, 1994) . Nevertheless, ladinos as a group have a much higher socio-economic status than the different indigenous groups, and poverty, which is concentrated in the rural areas, is much more prevalent among indigenous households.
2 This helps explain why unequal access to productive agricultural land among different ethnic groups has long been one of the major tensions disrupting society (Barry, 1992) . As opposed to other Latin American countries, unequal access to land was never alleviated by a redistributive land reform. Such tensions contribute to a climate of property rights insecurity, further aggrevated by the widespread lack of formal land titles. Most existing titles go back to the end of the 19th century, when, because of the coffee boom, the government encouraged the transformation from community to private property. Such transformations required an application by either individual possessors and/or the local authorities. In areas where cultural values related to common ownership were strong and no internal conflicts or outside speculators arose, the people occupying the land would not apply for a title.
3 Some longterm possessors lost (part of) their land as a result of false applications and/or land invasions by outsiders, who were often ladino. But not all of the new owners obtained a formal title. 4 Overall, the fate of a community (in terms of land titling and access) depended on a village location and population, and on how quickly local leaders came to understand the new situation (McCreery, 1994; Grandin, 2000) . The title status today is to a large extent driven by these historical events. While there have been various organized titling efforts by the government since the sixties, these activities were concentrated in other parts of the country. Lack of formal titles affects the rental market decisions in part because of legislation that allows registering an untitled plot of land in the public property registry after 10 years of peaceful and undisputed possession (the Ley de Titulación Supletoria). Although in principle this should not apply to land in rental, this law leaves room for false declarations, abuses and corruption, and as such de facto has been a source of property rights insecurity in the land rental market (Chang, 2002) .
Property rights insecurity is reinforced by long-standing tensions regarding access to land. Unequal distribution of land, resulting from perceived historical injustices during the colonization and early post-colonization eras, has been recognized as one of the causes underlying the violent civil conflict of the 1980s. As a result, a promise of access to land for the indigenous population was an important part of the peace agreements in 1996. By the beginning of 2002, this promise had been largely unfulfilled and the perceived failure of the government to address problems of access to land and rural poverty increased tensions considerably. Indigenous peasant organizations started anew to advocate invasions of large estates and blockades of major roads in the country. This further increased perceptions of widespread property rights insecurity.
Data
The data used in this paper were collected in June and July of 2002 from 4 municipalities in two departments of the country (Alta Verapaz and Quetzaltenango). The two regions were selected because they have high demand for land. Alta Verapaz is located in the North Central part of the country, a region of large coffee plantations, while Quetzeltenango is in the Western highlands. Within these departments, municipalities with a relatively high heterogeneity of land ownership and land quality were selected. The four municipalities have relatively good access to the main urban and market centers of Coban (in Alta Verapaz) and the city of Quetzaltenango (in Quetzaltenango).
In each municipality a random sample of 5 communities was surveyed, resulting in 20 communities. Data about all households living in the community (1822 in total) and about all their plots were obtained from interviews with a key 2 Seventy-six percentage of indigenous households are poor compared to 41% among the non-indigenous (World Bank, 2004) . 3 Over time, these communities moved from common to individual possession but without establishing formal titles. 4 This helps explain why there is no correlation in the dataset between the share of plots with secure property rights in a community and the ethnic diversity in the community (measured by the ethno-linguistic fractionalization or by the proportion of minority ethnicities in the community), indicating that historical titling status is not related to differences in ethnic diversity across communities. informant in each community. 5 The geographic location of all plots was identified by drawing plot-level village maps. Information was also collected about households that do not live in the community, but rent land from people in the community, and about absentee landlords (i.e., landowners renting land to community members), both when their land is located in the community, and when it is located elsewhere. While absentee landownership is an important phenomenon in Latin America, information about absentee landlords is often not obtained with a standard household survey as these households are hard to locate, and often not included in the sampling frame. The indirect survey approach relying on key informants enabled circumventing these problems. More generally, the use of key informants prevents problems of non-response or non-inclusion of certain types of households which is important when one wants to characterize the complete universe. That said, it relies on the accuracy of the information the key informants have about both landowners and tenants. Key informants were therefore carefully selected based on their knowledge of all households and their activities in the land market. In most villages this was the papa de tierra (''land father''), a customary leadership position typically occupied by an older person who knows all plots and their borders and is consulted on land related questions. 6 In Macours (2003) , the answers of similar key respondents are compared with answers from households themselves, for a related study in the Dominican Republic (Macours et al., 2010) . The level of agreement between the two types of respondents on key characteristics on physical and human capital, such as the ones used in this study, was found to be relatively high.
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Note that it is possible that the landlord has more accurate information about his tenant than the key informant through repeated interactions once the rental contract is established. But as we are modeling the partner choice, the relevant information to consider is the information about all potential tenants prior to the contract. Off course the remaining measurement error might still potentially be larger than for information obtained directly from household informants themselves. As long as measurement error is random this will only lead to attenuation bias. While non-random measurement error remains a potential concern, the indirect data collection approach was nevertheless preferred given the high risk of strategic misreporting or refusals to participation in the survey by individual households. These types of problems were likely to occur given sensitive nature of the topic of land in Guatemala, and had in fact affected previous survey efforts. 8 It was important to obtain comparable information regarding all participants in the land rental market, and in particular about absentee landlords because tenants and landlords often live geographically separated. In Alta Verapaz communities of peasants border to estates of large landowners, who themselves often live in the regional or national capital. People also often rent land in neighboring communities. In Quetzaltenango there is a geographic separation between communities with small peasant owners on the one hand, and communities with large owners, where tenants go rent land. Peasants from this region also temporary migrate to the coastal areas to rent land for a few months a year. Because land markets are not local, landlords incur costs to identify appropriate tenants, and some in fact hire private intermediaries for this purpose.
The types of rental contracts observed in both regions are mainly fixed rent contracts (138 plots), and interlinked landlabor contracts (132 plots). Fixed rent contracts are typically 1-year contracts with payments in advance. Both fixed rent and interlinked land-labor contracts are often renewed. There exist different versions of the later. In the ''colonato'' system (61 plots), access to a plot of land for subsistence crop production (and housing), is conditional on performing labor-services on the landlord's estate. In a related system, tenants obtain access to a plot of land, in exchange for working -or supervising the work on -other land from the owner (31 plots). A third system consists of intercropping a subsistence crop with a cash crop. The subsistence crop goes to the tenant, conditional on a ''satisfactory'' delivery of the cash crop to the landlord (40 plots). The type of interlinked land-labor contracts observed in Guatemala were commonly found in other parts of Latin America prior to the agrarian reforms. While all these interlinked land-labor contracts solve the cash constraint that might prevent access to land in fixed rent contracts for certain tenants, they also offer an enforcement mechanism for the landlord. Tenants are unlikely to claim property rights to the parcel of land, as this would imply losing their wage income in subsequent years, as well as any related rents such as housing. They are also unlikely to negate on the payment of the rent (i.e., the labor services) because access to the harvest of the crops of the rented plot is conditional on this payment. While in principle, enforcement of the property right and enforcement of the rental payment are distinct, in reality this distinction is rather diffuse, as refusing the (in kind) rental payment, is the first step towards squatting on the land. By 2002, the colonato system had come under pressure as a result of the crisis in the international coffee market. With the decreased need for wage labor because of the decision by many large coffee farmers to forgo harvesting, wage payments to the colonos stopped, and hence the incentives to respect property rights on the land too. Field interviews revealed that the interruptions in wage labor payments often triggered conflicts over land, as many peasants attempted to claim property 5 Households with a secondary residence in the community were also included (these are mostly large landowners who do not necessarily live year round on their estate). 6 The selection was made based on discussions with various community members, in which the type of information that would be asked for was explained. 7 Comparing the direct and the indirect measures, information for key characteristics similar to the ones used in this study was found to match for 70-98% of comparisons. Moreover, some of the discrepancies on land market activity in particular were found to be related to strategic misreporting of the households. 8 A similar approach to collecting sensitive land-related information has also been used in Bulgaria (Vranken et al., 2011) , and West Bengal-India (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2010) . 9 As such, the explanation of the interlinked land-labor contract is related to Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) and Sadoulet (1992) 's where interlinked transactions help reduce contract enforcement problems and limited liability issues. Other work has interpreted interlinked contracts as mechanisms to afford lower overall pay for labor services (de Janvry, 1981) ; or to circumvent incompleteness of labor markets (Bardhan, 1989) . The empirical analysis wil account for these alternative explanations.
rights as compensation. Nevertheless, many landlords often still keep a more limited, and better-remunerated number of colonos on their estates as protection against outside claims on their property. Sharecropping contracts are rare (only 12 plots). The difficulty of enforcing property rights and rental payments were the main reasons mentioned in field interviews for the absence of sharecropping contracts. Based on the fact that there is no interlinkage with wage income in sharecropping contracts and because of the lack of sufficient observations to analyze sharecropping contracts separately, they are grouped together with the fixed rent contracts for the empirical analysis. Results are robust to exclusion of plots with sharecropped contracts from the regressions.
Plots that are rented out are relatively small (on average .67 ha), and the plot size is not statistically different between fixed rent and interlinked land-labor contracts. The majority of rented out plots is used for maiz, and this also holds for both types of contracts. For fixed rent contracts, use for potatoes or horticulture is also relatively common.
To account for the choices faced by the landlord, the potential tenants need to be defined. For each household, the informants were asked whether, in their opinion, they would be willing to rent in land under a fixed rent contract, and under a land-labor contract. 10 The question referred to those contracts with contract terms as they are common in the region. While informants could misjudge the willingness or capability of some households, their answers are representing what othersincluding landlords -believe to be households' willingness to rent. If households were reported not to be able to rent under a fixed rent contract because of capital or liquidity constraints, they were not included among the potential tenants for fixed rent contracts. Potential tenants consist of households that were actually renting and those that would be willing to rent land under the specific contract. Table 1 reports the characteristics of the potential tenants by contract type. Only 16% of the potential tenants for a fixed rent contract are also potential tenants for a land-labor contract. The differences in tenant characteristics between the two contract-types confirm that demand for those two contracts comes from different types of households. Potential tenants for land-labor contract are more likely to have a male household head, more household members, and own more land. Potential tenant for a fixed rent contract have on average higher education, higher living standards and more household members abroad. They are hence more likely to have opportunities outside of agriculture.
Tenants can be ladino, or belong to one of the two indigenous groups that exist in each region (Mam and K'iche in Quetzaltenango; and Poqomchi and Q'eqchi in Alta Verapaz).
11 Table 1 shows that a large share of the potential tenants are indigenous for both types of contract. Hence matching along ethnic lines cannot be explained by the fact that indigenous households only self-select into interlinked contracts. Table 2 shows that on the supply side, about half of the landlords are ladino. The share of ladino owners is higher for land-labor contracts but overall there is quite some heterogeneity in contract type for each ethnic 1.4 manzana = 1 ha. ⁄ Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1% (s.e. clustered by community). a Living standard index: 1 = ''Low''; 2 = ''Regular''; 3 = ''High''.
10 Non-response to this question was very small (1%). Moreover, if information regarding these households willingness to rent is not available to the informant, it is likely also not available to landlords. Not counting these households as potential tenants approximates the local public knowledge. 11 Among the households surveyed for Alta Verapaz, a very small number belonged to the Achi ethnic group. These were aggregated with the next smallest ethnic group in the region, the Q'eqchi. Results are robust to exclusion of the Achi households (2 landlords and 4 tenants) from the regression.
group. As expected, other landlord characteristics, such as landownership and absenteeism, differ substantially between contracts and these differences will be controlled for in the empirical model. Around half (56%) of the plots that are rented out have a registered title. This is much higher than the average for all the plots in the dataset (22%), which is not surprising. In fact, the relatively high share of non-rented land reported as lying idle (11%) or underused (an additional 21%), might be a result of property right insecurity. Because many of the plots rented to households in the communities are not physically located in their communities, the decision to rent per se cannot be analyzed together with the partner and contract choice, as there is no information in the dataset about the counterfactuals (i.e. all the plots that could be rented, but are not).
Finally, it is worth noting that 86% of tenants only rent one plot of land, so that strategic choices regarding squatting on different plots of land are not a primary concern. Similarly 70% of landlords only rent out one plot of land, and 96% of landlords only rent out under one tenancy arrangement (either fixed rent or interlinked contracts). For simplicity, we treat the decision on each plot independently, but the standard errors allow for correlation of multiple plots from the same landlord.
Determinants of partner and contract choice
Let us sketch the conceptual framework that will result in the empirical specification of the joint partner and contract choice with a nested logit model. This allows to derive the interpretation of the different parameters, and to highlight the advantages of the nested logit approach over the alternative IV approach. In Section 5 we will empirically compare the different approaches.
Conceptual framework
Landlords are modeled to decide for a certain type of tenant and between a fixed rent contract and an interlinked landlabor contract. Landlords account for the probability of losing their land. The hypothesis is that insecurity of property rights will lead landlords to rent to members from the same ethnic group. This is likely to occur because contract enforcement mechanisms based on customary rules, information sharing and reputation effects among people with the same cultural and linguistic background are stronger within group than across groups. Interlinked land-labor contracts are hypothesized to provide an additional, or alternative, enforcement mechanism as tenants risk losing related wage benefits.
The landlord makes an offer to the tenant, and the tenant accepts or rejects. 12 Demand factors are accounted for through the reservation utility and the relative scarcity of potential tenants. Fixed rent contracts imply a payment in advance, and the descriptive statistics suggest that potential tenants for fixed rent contracts are likely to have more outside opportunities. We therefore assume that potential tenants for fixed rent contracts are not constrained in the labor market, while potential tenants for interlinked contracts are constrained. This allows landlords of interlinked contracts to create incentives not to squat by guaranteeing employment and setting terms that leave the tenant with a slightly higher utility than his reservation utility. The difference can be seen as the (extra) wage benefit the tenant gets through an interlinked contract. As such, protection of property rights comes through an efficiency wage type mechanisms -the tenant does not squat because he would lose his wage income and possible housing benefits related to the job in the future. Landlords have a lot of flexibility in determining the terms of interlinked contracts, as it implies setting wage, number of hours worked, timing of payment, etc. Landlords also account for the relative scarcity of potential tenants, which depends on how many households are willing to rent under a given contract. Tenants with scarce characteristics will imply a higher search cost for the landlord.
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The landlord makes his offer at t = 0. The tenant j decides at time t = 1 whether to squat or not on plot i, with the decision variable s ijk being either 0 (no squatting) or 1 (squatting).
14 The decision is determined by the trade-off between the value of all the future benefits of the plot in case he becomes the new owner, the value of reputation losses and, in the case of interlinked contracts, wage labor benefits. It is also affected by the probability of a successful squat. The value of the future benefits of the plot depends on the physical characteristics of the plot, and weights heavier in the trade-off when the probability of a successful squat is higher. Success will depend on the property rights security the landlord has for the plot as reclaiming possession of the land after a squat will be more difficult for landlords without formal title. The negative impact of squatting on a tenant's reputation depends on whether landlord and tenant belong to the same ethnic group and is larger if they do. Tenant's utility at time t = 1 will further depend on future wage benefits linked to the contract, which is positive in case of interlinked contracts, and zero otherwise. Finally, tenants have an unobserved aversion to squatting on landlord-plot i given contract k, e ijk . Let r (x s i ) be the probability of success of squatting on plot i, which is a function of the plot characteristics x s i that determines the tenure security of that plot; d the discount factor; V i the value of plot i, a function of physical characteristics of the plot x q i ; R(D ij ) the cost of the reputation loss related to squatting which is function of whether tenant j and the landlord of plot i belong to the same ethnic group (D ij ); and w k is the wage benefit from the contract. The tenant will decide to squat,
The outcome of this decision process will be
The landlord chooses tenant and contract-type, based on the trade-off between the profit he gets from renting out the plot of land versus the potential loss of future profit of the land, in case of a successful squat, and the costs involved in finding a tenant with certain characteristics. Landlords for whom the latter effects dominate for all potential tenants, will decide not to rent out at all and are not considered here. The landlord's utility from renting plot i to a tenant j under contract k is
where m ijk the unobserved part of the landlord's utility and p ijk the profit from plot i with tenant j and contract k. The productive assets of the tenant affect both the profit from the plot and the reservation utility of the tenant, which will affect the landlord's choice in opposite directions. Differences in profits of plot i by contract reflect other trade-offs landlords face in choosing between fixed rent and interlinked contracts such as the need for seasonal labor. u ijk is the reservation utility of tenant j willing to rent under contract k in the region of plot i, measured in monetary terms. Search costs C ijk refer to the cost of finding a tenant with characteristics of j, willing to cultivate under contract k in the region of plot i. The landlord will chose tenant j under contract k in order to maximize his expected utility:
Note that, by focusing on the tenant's incentives for squatting, the moral hazard problem in the model differs from the problem of unobserved effort in many other models of tenancy markets. In contrast with e.g. Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) , the interlinkage of markets reduces the probability of squatting, not the probability of shirking. However, as in other models of interlinkage, landlords can induce tenants to behave in the way they would like them to behave by offering more favorable contract terms in the interlinked market.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that we do not account for a potential important alternative the landlords could chose: offer a wage contract instead of a rental contract. This decision is driven by data limitations, as there no is no information available regarding matching in the wage labor market. It indicates a potentially important caveat, as property rights insecurity could lead landowners to chose for wage contracts to reduce the possibility of squatting, even if they might come with increased labor supervision cost.
Specification empirical model
The empirical model is set-up to reflect the key insights from the conceptual framework. In particular, a nested logit approach is used as it allows to model key features of the joint decision landlords make when considering which contract to use and whom to rent out to. In particular, we allow landlords' tenant choice to depend on potential tenant choices in the market, and on the search costs related to different tenant types. A key characteristic for tenant choice is ethnic proximity to the 13 In other words, if matching were random, all landlords would be more likely to match with the tenant-type that is most common in the region. Deviating from those tenant-types increases search costs, which depend on the relative scarcity of the different types. 14 Although fixed rent contracts are paid in advance, the decision to squat happens at the end of the season (at t = 1), when tenants decide not to vacate the plot and to renege on the next rental payment. Tenants decide to squat at the end of the first season, or never squat. landlord, which is allowed to matter differentely depending on property rights security. And the importance of the choice of tenant is allowed to differ by contract type.
More specifically, the geographically disperse nature of the land rental markets in Guatemala implies that the dataset does not contain information about every single household that could be considered as a potential tenant by the landowner. 15 Instead we define a number of tenant categories based on key characteristics that are likely to determine the partner choice by the landowner. This allows classifying all potential tenants into a limited number of tenant-types that together characterize the universe of choices available to the landlord. We then analyze the probability of renting plot i to tenant-type j and not to all other tenant-types in the market. As such, we not only account for the characteristics of the chosen tenant-type, but also for the characteristics of the next-best type(s). To establish the relationship between property rights security and partner choice, we define tenant-types in two different ways. In a first set of specifications, three tenant-types are defined based on ethnicity. We test whether landowners without formal property rights security are more likely to rent out to potential tenants with the same ethnicity, as opposed to tenants from the two other ethnicities living in the region. Because ethnicity might be correlated with other tenant characteristics that could affect landlords' choice, in particular with tenants' asset endowment, we also use a second definition of tenanttypes. In particular, 12 different types are defined that represent all possible combinations of ethnicity, labor and capital endowments (see further). Hence we assume that every landlord will be able to find a tenant with the specific combinations of characteristics he desires. To account for the fact that some tenant-types are more common and hence easier to find, and that the difference in search costs this creates might influence tenant choice, a variable measuring the number of potential tenants in each tenant category for each region is included in the regression.
Because interlinked land-labor contracts imply an implicit property rights enforcement mechanism, we hypothesize that partner choice will be less important for land-labor contracts. To test this hypothesis, a nested logit is estimated allowing partner choice to have a different effect on utility for the two types of contracts. Let the landlord's utility from renting plot i under contract k to tenant-type j be
and assume that e ijk , for all tenant-types j possibly considered by the landlord from plot i, are distributed in accordance with a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution. 16 B ik is the set of choices available to the landlord, i.e., the set of possible tenant-types, by region and contract. The GEV allows the e ijk 's within each subset to be correlated. k k is the coefficient of dissimilarity, and 0 < k k 6 1.
(1 À k k ) is hence a measure of correlation of unobserved utility within each subset B ik , where k is equal to either f (fixed rent contract) or l (land-labor contract). Following Train (2003), the landlords utility from renting plot i under contract k to tenant-type j, can be decomposed into:
where W ik is the mean of V ijk over all alternatives in subset B ik ; and Y ijk the deviation of V ijk from the mean W ik . 17 The probability of choosing tenant-type j in subset B ik can then be written as 
In the joint contract-tenant decision, W ik is determined by the landlord-or plot-specific characteristics affecting the contract choice, and Y ijk is determined by a vector of characteristics of the partnership created by matching the landlord of plot i with tenant-type j and contract k. Given this specification, k k I ik is a measure of the expected extra utility that the decision maker receives by being able to choose the best alternative in the set B ik . Hence, formulating the model as a nested logit allows comparing the utility from being able to chose, which might suggest differences in implicit enforcement linked to the two types of contracts. If interlinked labor contracts are easier to enforce, we expect the choice of tenant to be less important, and therefore the k k I ik to be smaller.The bottom level of the nested logit reflects the probability of the landowner of plot i, to match with tenant-type j, and not with all the other potential tenant-types, given contract k. As such this is similar to a conditonal logit estimation of partner choice alone. Y ijk is determined by the vector of characteristics affecting this choice by the landlord, ðD ij ; x s i ; x q i ; z j ; n ijk Þ. It contains variables measuring whether landlord and tenant are from the same ethnicity, D ij ; a plot-specific measure of property rights security, x s i ; tenant's asset endowment, x q i ; characteristics related to plot quality, and regional differences, z j ; and the scarcity of different potential tenant-types for each contract in each region, n ijk . The upper level of the nested logit is the choice between the fixed-rent and the interlinked land-labor contract. W ik is a function of landlord and plot characteristics ðx indicating landlord characteristics affecting labor demand. In order to estimate the relationship with the contract choice, these variables are interacted with a dummy variable, d k , taking the value 1 for a fixed rent contract, and 0 for the interlinked land-labor contract. 15 The approach to modeling partner choice in this paper therefore differs from the one used for local rental markets in the Dominican Republic by Macours et al. (2010) . 16 As few landlords rent more than one plot, we treat each landlord-plot as a separate observation. Note however that standard errors will be clustered at the level of the community, and as such also account for correlation between plots of the same landlord. This also accounts for possible correlations caused by reliance on key informants. 17 While this decomposition allows separating out factors affecting contract choice and tenant choice, it does not imply that the partner and contract decisions are taken sequentially.
In order to interpret W ik as the mean of V ijk over all alternatives in subset B ik one might expect that the average of the tenant characteristics that are modeled to determine the partner choice should enter the contract choice decision. However, because the universe of tenant-types is considered for each tenant-type, and because these are defined in similar ways for both contracts, the mean tenant characteristics cancel out of the equation. Given that the number of potential tenants by contract and tenant-type is the same for each landlord-plot within a region, the effect of the mean number of potential tenants willing to rent under the two contracts is captured by a regional fixed effect, included in x q i . Similarly, the reservation utility of potential tenants, which is likely to be higher for fixed rent contracts, is the same for all landlords in the region and is captured by the regional fixed effect.
The structure provided by the nested logit hence allows to account for a number of potentially important characteristics of the joint partner-contract choice. It has advantages over a more restricted conditional logit model of partner choice, as it allows to test whether the partner choice is differentiately important for different contract types. It is also goes beyond an instrumental variable approach to the joint partner-contract choice, as it specifically accounts for the non-chosen alternative partners landlords face in the rental market. The nested logit framework also facilitates simultaneously analyzing the importance of several tenant characteristics for the partner choice. And by defining different tenant types, lessons can be derived regarding the importance of search costs. To illustrate these advantages, Section 5 will compare the estimates of the nested logit with both the conditional logit and the IV approaches.
Identification
The empirical specification implies that possible observed and unobserved landlord, plot and contract characteristics (including regional differences) that might affect tenant choice are controlled for because the landlord's choice for one tenant-type and not for all others under a given contract is modeled. Specifically, plot, landlord, and contract characteristics cancel out of the P ijjB ik term in Eq. (3). The remaining identification concerns relate to possible unobservables that specifically affect matching along ethnic lines and might be correlated with title status. As discussed, most variation in land titling resulted from historical decisions at the end of the 19th century. While no systematic titling efforts have occurred in the regions of study since then, individual owners might have obtained titles, e.g. through the Ley de Titulación Supletoria. In fact, in the data, out of the 282 plots that are rented, 17 obtained a formal title after the plot was transferred to the current owner (and on average current owners obtained their plot 17 years ago). Given that the decision to apply for a formal title is possibly not exogenous to the partner choice on the land rental market, we do not use the current title status of the plot as an independent variable. Instead we use two proxies for current property right security.
The first measures the titling status of the plot at the moment the current owner obtained it. Given that many plots were obtained through inheritance, the title status was often a given for the current owner. A remaining concern is then that those landlords who inherited titled land, might also differ in other characteristics. Indeed, they tend to be more often large and absentee landowners, and are less likely to be from the majority ethnic group (Table 3) . We will therefore test whether these and other characteristics are correlated with matching along ethnic lines and show that that the results are robust to inclusion of different sets of control variables and alternative specifications.
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The second variable relies on the fact that the applications for titling at the end of the 19th century occurred for large tracts of land simultaneously, either by individuals or by community leaders. While much of this land was subsequently fragmentized among many owners, the title status of the different plots is still correlated. Based on the information about the geographical location of the plots, we use the average past and current title status of upto 5 neighboring plots, excluding plots from the same owner, to obtain a prediction of the title status of the rented plot. For plots located outside of the 20 communities for which we have maps, we use the average past title status of plots in the dataset from the same locality. The estimation in Table 4 shows that there is a strong correlation between past title status of neighboring plots and a plot's title status. We use the predicted status as the second measure of property rights insecurity in the regressions.
It seems reasonable to assume that the title status of neighboring plots does not affect matching along ethnic lines other than through the correlation with the title status itself. There are however two possible ways in which that assumption might not hold. First, it could be that certain plot or landlord characteristics that are both related to the partner choice decision, and to the plot's title status are spatially correlated. It is for example possible that plot quality, which is spatially correlated, determined why certain plots were titled in the 19th century, and at the same time affects partner choice along ethnic lines. We will therefore test the robustness of the findings for controlling for plot quality. Similarly, we control for a number of household level variables as owners of neighboring plots might share certain characteristics that affect their outcomes, but also relate to whether their plots have titles.
Second, one could argue that outcomes of neighboring plots are related to each other because of boundary or spill-over effects. This could bias the results if title status of neighboring plots would lead to certain rental outcomes on those neighboring plots that in turn affect the partner choice for the plots under study. But given that the outcome of interest is partner choice in the rental market, and given that only a small share of plots is rented out, the possibility of such boundary effects seems limited. That said, other characteristics of the neighboring plots could affect the partner choice for the plots under 18 The number of control variables we can add is limited, however, to landlord characteristics that were known by the key informants. This is particularly relevant for the absentee landlords. Variables that are clearly jointly determined with partner or contract choice (such as plot size and landlord's ownership of agricultural equipment) are also not included. study. In particular, the ethnicity of the owners of neighboring plots might possibly affect the expropriation risk related to renting to tenants with the same ethnicity. This could particularly be a concern if ethnicity is related to title status.
Other variable definitions
The variable measuring whether landlord and tenant are from the same ethnicity, D ij , equals 1 if landlord and tenant are from the same ethnicity and 0 otherwise. Hence it captures not only possible preferences of ladino landowners for ladino tenants, but also preferences of an indigenous landlord for a tenant from the same indigenous group, versus one from the other indigenous group or a ladino. As such, it accounts for matching along ethnic lines. D ij is interacted with the property rights variables, to test the hypothesis that renting within ethnic groups is less likely when property rights are stronger.
Variables capturing the tenant-types' labor and capital endowment, z j , are whether the household has more than 3 adult household members and ownership of agricultural equipment. 19 The number of adult household members is the sum of the household head, his spouse, and the total number of adult children of the household. Adult children not living in the household anymore were included, to obtain an exogenous measure of household size. Moreover, past equipment ownership is used (i.e., a dummy variable measuring whether the tenant owned agricultural equipment 5 years ago). The relative scarcity of the different types of potential tenants for each contract in each region, n ijk , is approximated by the number of potential tenants from each tenant-type in the sample communities of the region. 20 We hence assume that the relative scarcity of the potential tenant-types in these communities, which are representative for 2 municipalities in each region, is a good proxy for the relative scarcity of tenant-types in the broader area from which landlords might draw tenants. Finally landlord characteristics that affect labor demand, x l i , are total land ownership, and a dummy variable indicating whether the owner is an absentee landlord, defined as living more than 3 h walking away. De facto this means living in the 19 Tenant-types' labor and capital endowment is characterized by these variables because they are both easily observable by landowners and likely to affect the productive potential of the tenants. Binary variables are used to allow for classification in a limited number of tenant-types. 20 While the willingness to rent might be determined by the supply of land and contract terms in the market, the amount of people willing to rent under a certain contract is exogenous to the individual landlords.
regional or national capital. Plot characteristics capturing land quality, x q i , are the per-unit land value, and a regional dummy. Many of the landowner and plot characteristics that are hypothesized to affect contract choice could potentially be endogenous. The main purpose for adding them to the model is to control for other factors that affect contract choice. We therefore present results with and without them and show that the key findings of the paper are robust across the different specifications.
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More general, because of the lack of experimental variation we are careful in this paper not to make strong causal inferences. Instead we focus on the insights that can be gained from jointly estimating partner and contract choice to shed light on a potential mechanism underlying market segmentation.
Results
Before discussing the results of the nested logit model, we first establish the relationship between partner choice and property rights security using the conditional logit model. The conditional logit can be considered as a special case of the nested logit model, in which k is fixed (see above). We then present the estimates of the nested logit, and check the robustness of the results with different modifications to the base specification. We subsequently estimate the partner-contract choice using the alternative IV approach. The comparison of the results allows to draw lessons regarding the additional insights that are gained from the nested logit framework.
Property rights security and partner choice
The conditional logit model estimates the probability of renting plot i to tenant-type j, and not to other tenant-types. Tenant-type here is defined by ethnicity only. Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the community level. Column 1 in Table 5 shows that landowners are more likely to chose tenants with the same ethnicity, but only if the plot does not have a historical title. The results in column 2 establish that controlling for matching along ethnic lines, landowners are more likely to choose tenant-types that are less scarce, i.e. those tenant-types for which the number of observed potential tenants is higher. In column 3 we control for exogenous plot characteristics that might differ across the regions, which does not affect the results. While other physical characteristics of the plots (i.e. quality) might be endogenous, we nevertheless show that the results on the property rights variable are not affected by including these characteristics in the specification (in column 4). In column 5 we show a further robustness test by including other landlord characteristics. In columns 6-10 we repeat Robust z statistics (accounting for clustering at the community-level) in parentheses. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. 21 Landownership will be included in many of the specifications, as it is largely predetermined. As discussed, the immobility of the land distribution is exactly the reason for a lot of the conflicts in Guatemala. Indeed, we have information on the historical land ownership of the parents of the household heads for a subset of households (mainly those living in the communities) and the correlation between parents' and household's landownership is 96%.
these specifications, but use the predicted title status of the plot. The results of all the different specifications confirm that landlords are more likely to rent out land to tenants from the same ethnicity, unless they have secure property rights. Table 6 shows the results of the nested logit model, estimating the joint partner and contract choice. In column 1, landowners are modeled to choose between a fixed rent and an interlinked land-labor contract, and 3 tenant-types, defined in terms of ethnicity. Column 2 adds the full set of landowner characteristics to the specification. In column 3, the estimation includes the same two contract choices, and 12 different tenant-types, defined by the different combinations of variables measuring the key characteristics: ethnicity variables, a dummy variable measuring ownership of agricultural tools 5 years ago, and a dummy variable indicating whether the household has more than three adult members. Columns 4, 5 and 6 show results of similar specifications with the predicted title, instead of the historical title.
Main results: joint partner and contract choice
The nested logits were estimated using full-information maximum likelihood estimations. Because in the nested logit model, the standard errors cannot be easily adjusted for clustering by community, we used bootstrapped standard errors that account for such clustering, to calculate the z-statistics. 22 The hypotheses that the coefficients of the inclusive values Absolute value of z statistics calculated with bootstrapped standard errors (accounting for clustering at the community level) in brackets. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.
22 Because clustering at the community level implies that observations are only assumed to be independent across communities, the bootstrapped standard errors also account for correlation between plots rented out by the same owner. Moreover, such correlation does not seem to be a major issue: there is actually quite some variation of tenant-types by owner. Of the 44 owners who rent more than one plot, only 6 chose the same tenant-type for all plots. The fact that relatively few owners have more than one plot rented prevents an analysis of the variation in tenant-types within plots of the same landowner.
are both equal to one can be rejected for all specifications, supporting the choice for a nested logit over a more restrictive model.
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The finding that landlords are more likely to rent to tenants from the same ethnicity, but only if they do not have a registered formal title to the land, is robust across all specifications. Similarly, the nested logit results show that the scarcity of each tenant-type is strongly significant, suggesting that search costs are indeed important and landlords are more likely to match with a more common tenant-type. Landlords also seem to prefer tenants with a higher number of household members.
The lambda coefficient for the inclusive values is found to be smaller for interlinked contracts than for fixed rent contracts. The chi 2 of the log likelihood tests confirms that the difference is significant for all specifications. This implies that Absolute value of z statistics calculated with bootstrapped standard errors (accounting for clustering at the community level) in brackets. * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1% 23 The dissimilarity coefficients are above 0 and less than 1, or not significantly different from 1 (except for the specification in column 5), implying that they are consistent with stochastic utility maximization (McFadden, 1981) .
the correlation in unobserved factors affecting utility is higher for interlinked contracts, or hence that substitutability between tenant-types is higher. Moreover, the average value of the product k k I ik is higher for fixed rent contracts, suggesting that the expected extra utility from being able to choose is higher. Hence, for fixed rent contracts it is more important to be able to choose the right tenant. This difference exists for the specifications with both definitions of tenant-types (with and without the capital and labor endowment of the tenants), suggesting it is driven by matching along ethnic lines. The negative sign of title status implies that k k I ik , and hence the importance of being able to chose, is smaller for those who have secure property rights. This is consistent with the potential role of interlinked land-labor contracts as an enforcement mechanism. 24 Finally, Table 6 shows that absentee landowners (with more land) are more likely to choose an interlinked contract, consistent with the possible need to ensure cheap (peak-time) labor and/or supervision. 25
Alternative specifications
An assumption underlying the model we have estimated is that the differences in ethnicity do not have asymmetric effects. We now test this assumption explicitly, by multiplying (D ij ) with two dummy variables: the first one equals one if the landowner is ladino; the second equals one if landowner is indigenous. We also interact these variables with the property rights variables (columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 ). The sign of both variables and their interaction terms are similar. While the magnitudes of the point estimates are larger for ladino landowners, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the same. Hence matching along ethnic lines does not only occur among ladinos, but is also used by the indigenous landowners. Interestingly, this is driven in part by not renting out to people from other indigenous groups.
As a further test, we want to investigate whether the patterns in the data could also be explained by discrimination of indigenous tenants by both ladino and indigenous landlords, as opposed to renting within ethnic group. In order to test that hypothesis, we first redefine the tenant-categories, only distinguishing between ladino and non-ladino tenants.
26 Columns 3
and 4 in Table 7 show that tenant's ethnicity per se does not explain partner choice. We find that plots with or without title are not less likely to be rented out to ladino tenants. Overall these results suggest that property rights insecurity triggers matching along ethnic lines rather than discrimination of indigenous tenants by all landlords. Next we investigate whether there is evidence for assortative matching along other characteristics instead of ethnicity. This can help shed light on whether the results on matching along ethnic lines are driven by ethnicity itself, or rather by other characteristics that might be correlated with ethnicity. We therefore estimate models testing for matching along socio-economic class, land ownership class, or religion. In particular, we test whether households are more likely to match with people of the same living standard group, compared to households from with a different living standard classification (columns 1 and 2 in Table 8) . 27 We also classified households in three land ownership classes depending on whether they were in the first, second or third part of the land ownership distribution, and test whether people match within class (columns 3 and 4 in Table 8 ). And finally, we classify households by religion, as there are Catholics, Protestants, and people practicing other (traditional) religions. Given that religion is an important part of social life and could be correlated with ethnicity, and attending the same religious services is likely to increase information and trust among people, we test whether people are more likely to match with tenants from the same religion (columns 5 and 6 in Table 8 ). We do not find evidence of assortative matching when using any of these alternative categories. Finally, by using the nested logit model, while allowing for correlation among unobserved characteristics of tenant-types willing to accept the same contract, we assume that unobserved utility is not correlated across nests (i.e., that there is no correlation in unobserved characteristics for tenant-types wanting to rent under different contracts). This assumption can be motivated by the fact that we model the choice of a tenant-type, not the choice of an individual tenant. Because the tenant-type is an aggregate measure, it is less likely that there is an unobserved characteristic that holds for all tenants belonging to one type willing to rent under a certain contract, which at the same time holds for all tenants belonging to a type willing to rent under the other contract. As illustrated in Table 1 , at least the observed characteristics between the potential tenants for both contracts are indeed different. The low level of overlap of potential tenants for the two contract types, further motivates this assumption. Given that the assumption implies that the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption must hold within nests it can be tested by omitting a tenant-category for each of the contract-types and using a Hausman test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984) . The IIA within nest could not be rejected for the different specifications. 
Comparison with instrumental variable estimation of contract choice
The nested logit model differs in a number of ways from the instrumental variable approach that Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) suggested for estimation of contract choice equations with endogenous matching. They regress contract choice on the 24 However, to the extent that titles might be correlated with other landlord characteristics, it does not necessarily rule out other interpretations. 25 As discussed, the variables measuring of absentee ownership and land quality are potentially endogenous and are therefore more suggestive than the other findings. 26 After combining tenants' ethnicity with assets, this results in 8 potential tenant-types for each landlord, instead of 12. 27 Households were classified by the key informants as having a high, regular, or low living standard. 28 A model with the reverse nesting structure was also estimated (not reported). The estimation shows estimates outside the unit interval for several of the dissimilarity coefficients (including some negative). This suggest that this reverse model is not consistent with utility maximization and does not accurately specify the correlation structure (Herriges and Kling, 1996; Hauber and Parsons, 2000) , providing additional support for the assumption of no correlation in unobserved characteristics across nests in the original specification.
landlord-plot's crop choice and the tenant's wealth. Recognizing that including both landlord and tenant characteristics in a contract choice equation causes endogeneity problems because certain characteristics are likely to be unobserved, the crop choice is instrumented for with regional fixed effects and the interaction of these regional fixed effects with the tenant's wealth. In the nested logit approach, the matching equation is estimated in the bottom-level of the nested logit, as a function of Y ijk , which plays a similar role as the first stage estimation in the IV.
In order to compare both approaches, we redefine the model and include only one tenant-related characteristic, D ij , as determinant of Y ijk . Following their approach, but with the landlord's characteristic being exogenous as opposed to the tenant's, we estimate a linear probability model of contract choice on the variable indicating whether landlord and tenant are from the same ethnicity, D ij , and landlord-plot characteristics. For identification, we use an instrument that most closely matches Ackerberg and Botticini's, by interacting the regional fixed effects with the title status of the plot, to instrument for D ij (Table 9 , column 2). Both the coefficient of title and of the interaction term are significantly negative, confirming the earlier finding that there is matching along ethnic group, but only if the landowner does not have a title for the plot. Comparing the results of the IV estimation with the OLS estimation (columns 1 and 3) shows that once endogenous matching is accounted for, the point estimate of the coefficient of D ij in the contract choice equation is 10 times higher and has a higher, though not significant t-statistic. When the other landlord characteristics are added to the estimation, these results prove robust (columns 4-6). The results of the first stage confirm the matching along ethnic groups with insecurity of property rights. The IV estimation also confirms the finding that absentee landlords are less likely to choose fixed rent contracts, and that title status has no significant relationship with contract choice. 29 The comparison with the OLS further documents the type of bias that can result from not accounting for endogenous matching. Indeed, in an analysis of contract choice that does not account for landlord-tenant matching, one could hypothesize that the choice of fixed rent contracts could be driven by liquidity constraints, while the choice of interlinked contracts could be driven by labor constraints. The coefficient on the absentee landlord variables seems to support the later, while the estimate on the land ownership seems to contradict the former. However, as the IV estimates make clear, these results are much weaker once matching is accounted for, as such demonstrating the potential bias in the naive contractchoice estimation.
Comparison of instrumental variable estimation with nested logit estimation
Overall, the results of the IV estimations confirm that there is endogenous matching along ethnic lines with property rights security. But the results regarding the importance of matching along ethnic lines for contract choice are less conclusive. To better compare the results of the two methods a number of differences between them should be pointed out. First, the nested logit framework allows accounting for the universe of potential tenant-types for each contract type, and not only for the characteristics of the specific tenant-type the landowner matches with. In such a framework it is the characteristics of the tenant, as compared to the characteristics of the other potential tenants that is modeled to affect the joint partner and contract choice. While the IV estimation only accounts for overall differences in the distribution of landlords and tenants with a regional dummy, the nested logit model incorporates the relative scarcity of each tenant-type, by contract and by region. The results show that the relative scarcity is significantly related to partner choice. Another advantage of the nested logit framework is that it facilitates analyzing the relationship of several tenant characteristics with the partner choice. Robust t statistics calculated using standard errors accounting for clustering at the community level in parentheses. 8 Quetzales = 1 US$, 1.4 manzana = 1 ha.
Partner choice and matching is likely to be affected by different tenant characteristics, but including them in the IV estimation, would require finding appropriate instruments for each of them. Finally, the nested logit framework allows deriving conclusions on the differences in the importance of partner choice along these traits for different types of contracts. The combination of a dataset that allows characterizing the universe of potential tenant-types and the nested logit estimation approach hence permits incorporating a larger set of factors in modeling the joint decision process of partner and contract choice. While this implies making distributional assumptions on the correlation patterns between the unobserved characteristics of these different alternatives, it allows accounting for the non-chosen alternatives. In contrast, in the IV approach, the non-chosen alternatives are assumed not to affect the decision making process. The results in this paper show that additional insights in matching and contract choice can be gained by incorporating the non-chosen alternatives in the model. This is particularly interesting when matching leads to market segmentation, and therefore might exacerbate existing inequalities.
Conclusions and policy implications
This paper shows a robust relationship between property rights insecurity and partner and contract choice by landowners in Guatemala. Landowners without formal title are more likely to restrict their partners for a rental contract to tenants from the same ethnic group. Partner choice is less important for renting with interlinked land-labor contracts, which could indicate that the enforcement mechanisms implicit in these interlinked contracts are a property guarantee for the landowner. The paper further shows that accounting for all the potential partner-types when considering the effects of endogenous matching in contract choice equations can provide important insights. In particular, the importance of the relative scarcity of different tenant-types suggests the importance of search costs. When data are available, or can be collected, that allow characterizing the universe of potential tenants, the methodology used in this paper can hence provide valuable insights into the joint process of partner and contract choice.
While this paper does not provide direct evidence of the effect of this ethnic market segmentation on productivity, the finding that ethnicity matters for partner and contract choice, even after controlling for tenants' assets, suggests that the first-best allocation is not reached. 30 Land allocation within ethnic circles of confidence, is not only likely to decrease short-term efficiency, but could also be a reason for more ethnic tensions. Moreover, the interlinked contracts are generally considered a perpetuation of old feudal structures, and their persistence is itself a cause for tensions across ethnic groups. Paradoxically, while this type of contract might be the only feasible way of access to land for many indigenous households, their very existence might contribute to further tensions and contract enforcement problems.
In conclusion, this paper provides evidence of the role of ethnicity for contract enforcement when property rights are insecure. Where ethnic exclusion results from the need for contract enforcement, policy might have to focus on facilitating alternative enforcement mechanisms. This is particularly the case because exclusion of certain groups from desirable contracts might further increase social tensions and the potential for violent conflicts in ethnically diverse societies.
